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“I see no greater strategic challenge for Europe than to 
understand the dramatic rise of China and to forge ties with it.” 
Peter Mandelson, EU Commissioner for External Trade, 2005 
1.  Introduction 
Internationalisation of Chinese companies, unthinkable even a decade ago, has hit the 
headlines of leading newspapers. The names such as Lenovo, Haier, and CNPC became 
recognisable brands, and the world is witnessing the shift from “Made in China” to 
“Made by China”. China’s rapid economic rise and its global ambitions have given 
ground  to  call  the  21
st  century  as  the  Chinese  Century.  The  Chinese  economy  has 
become a scholarly pursuit, with numerous publications and studies on this topic. 
While China itself is a lucrative growing market, the competitive forces drive domestic 
companies to pursue an active policy of expansion abroad and to seek to strengthen their 
market  position  on  a  global  stage  (Child  and  Rodrigues,  2005;  Boisot,  2004).  The 
prospect that China is becoming a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
being received with a mixture of enthusiasm and anxiety by many recipient countries. 
While the inflow of long-term equity investment is wholeheartedly received by many 
economies, some, especially developed countries raise concerns about the motivations 
and quality of the Chinese capital.  
In particular, the potential infringements of intellectual property rights, loss of control 
over  natural  resources  in  the  event  of  global  scarcity;  questionable  management 
techniques and governance practices; and the unsavoury human rights reputation of the 
Chinese government and, by extension, of its stable of state-owned enterprises. While 
some  of  these  mentioned  concerns  are  not  without  merit,  it  would  be  unwise  for 
recipient  countries,  including  Europe,  to  reject  Chinese  investment  on  basis  of 
generalisations about the motivations and practices of the Chinese government. 
Since  China  will  very  likely  continue  to  be  the  major  exporter  of  capital  for  the 
foreseeable future, its important role for the European economies cannot be ignored but 
rather must be evaluated in the context of the Chinese institutional environment that has 
shaped its internationalisation strategy. It is with this in-depth knowledge that European 
policy  makers  and  business  practitioners  alike  can  be  prepared  to  strike  a  balance 
between the promises and perils of Chinese outward investors and eventually to reap the 




































that this explorative paper seeks to provide an overview of the patterns and motives of 
Chinese  outward  investments  and  the  government  policies  that  have  facilitated  the 
Chinese  internationalisation  process,  with  an  explicit  focus  on  Europe,  i.e. 
Europeanisation of Chinese firms. In this attempt, we address some white spots in the 
literature regarding this research area.  
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  elaborates  on  the  internationalisation 
motives and drivers of Chinese firms. Section 3 provides a detailed overview of China’s 
state policy on the outward direct investment. It is followed by Section 4 which focuses 
on Europe as a destination for Chinese investment; particularly, it illustrates increasing 
involvement of Chinese companies into the European business and economic arena. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Rise of the Dragon 
Today, China has become the world’s fifth largest outward direct foreign investor with a 
total of 75 billion US dollars in outward stock by the end of 2006 (MOFCOM, 2007). 
Noteworthy, the country has increased its annual FDI outflow significantly over the last 
two decades: the average annual outward FDI flows grew from 450 million US dollars 
in the 1980s to 2.3 billion US dollars in the 1990s (UNCTAD, 2004: 57). Only a short 
time period in the recent years already records a large increase in the value of outward 











Figure 1 China’s outward FDI stock in the 2003- 2006 



































The distribution of Chinese outward FDI to different regions is depicted in Figure 2, 
highlighting a sharp increase in the FDI outward flow towards Asia and Latin America, 
while Africa, North America and Europe have experienced an incremental increase in 
Chinese FDI flow. The following sections will provide an overview of the main drivers 
and  motives  of  Chinese  internationalisation activity  that  have  led  to  the  impressive 
surge  in  Chinese  outward  FDI  activity  and  analyses  the  rationale  for  Chinese 






















Figure 2 China’s outward FDI flow by regions, period of 2003-2006      
Source: authors’ calculation based MOFCOM (2007) 
 
2.1. Theoretical Rationale and Drivers for Chinese outward FDI  
The  last  two  decades  have  experienced  a  surge  in  the  emergence  of  multinational 
companies  from  developing  economies  (Heenan  and  Keegan,  1979;  Kumar  and 
McLeod,  1981;  Kumar,  1982;  Lall,  1983;  Wells,  1983),  resulting  in  significant 
academic interest later in the 1990s and especially in the 2000s, corresponding to the 
increasing  importance  of  these  companies  in  the  global  economy  (Sauvant,  2005; 
OECD, 2006; UNCTAD, 2006; Goldstein, 2007; Benito and Narula, 2007; BCG, 2008). 
Especially, the phenomenon of Chinese internationalization has increasingly drawn the   8 
attention of scholars (Ye, 1992; Tseng, 1994; Wu and Chen, 2001; Wong and Chan, 
2003;  Child  and  Rodrigues,  2005).    Traditionally,  the  rationale  for  Chinese 
internationalisation has been searched within the classical OLI paradigm developed by 
Dunning (1977, 1988), where the wish to exploit existing ownership advantages, asset 
exploitation, is regarded as one of the three key drivers for internationalisation. In the 
case of China, asset exploitation would involve costs advantages due to the low wages 
and production improvements achieved in recent years. This competitive advantage is 
asserted to allow the company to secure sufficient returns in order to cover the risks and 
costs that overseas operation entail (Buckley and Ghauri, 1999; Caves, 1971)
1. While 
the cost advantage of Chinese companies is a relatively important competitive factor for 
simple and lower income markets, it is not sufficient to compete in higher value-adding 
markets. Hence,  the  initial competitive advantage of low labour costs  becomes  less 
crucial as the firm moves into more sophisticated international markets. In order to 
explain  why  Chinese  companies  still  pursue  the  international  expansion  in  more 
sophistication  markets, one  has  to  deviate from  the  classical  theoretical  framework. 
Instead, recent theoretical developments in the field of emerging country multinationals 
emphasise  the  relative  disadvantage  of  companies  from  emerging  economies  which 
drives them to internationalise. Hence, contrary to the notion of competitive advantage, 
companies will move abroad to avoid a number of competitive disadvantages incurred 
by operating exclusively in the domestic market. In the case of China, a number of 
disadvantageous domestic conditions can push Chinese firms to internationalise. For 
example, Child and Rodrigues (2005: 388) list the following ones: 
-  regional  protectionism  limiting  opportunities  available  otherwise  in  a  large 
domestic market to exploit economies of scale; 
-  restricted access to capital preventing investment in plants of optimal scale;  
-  underdeveloped  intellectual  property  rights  (IPR)  regime  limiting  access  to 
sophisticated technologies;  
-  lack of skilled human resources; 
-  weak local infrastructure entailing rising transportation costs. 
                                                
1  Further  key  drivers  of  internationalisation  include  the  location  specific  advantages,  such  as  the 
attractiveness of overseas location over domestic market, as well as the internationalisation advantage of 
companies,  where  the  investment  and  production  overseas  is  more  profitable  than  exporting  goods 
produced domestically.   9 
Hence, the concept of relative disadvantage regards international investment as a means 
of addressing competitive disadvantages in the home markets.  This paper adopts the 
view that additionally to the initial ownership advantage of Chinese firms, the presence 
of domestic pressures and constrains explains the ongoing internationalisation process 
of Chinese companies. Consequently, we present both the “pull” and “push” factors that 
drive Chinese internationalisation as well as the main facilitating factor, the Chinese 
government that has supported the Chinese overseas experience.  
Table 1 Rationale of Chinese outward investment 
Drivers (pull and push)   Facilitators 
-  Dangers of operating in an increasingly 
competitive and complex domestic market, 
and decreasing profit margins. 
-  Potential to complement cost advantages of 
domestic production with differentiation 
advantages overseas. 
-  Necessity to access and secure advanced 
technology and expertise. 
-  Acquisition of internationally recognised 
brands. 
-  Access to entrepreneurial and managerial 
skills and know-how. 
-  Strong governmental 
support for 
internationalisation: 
o  financial incentives 
o  non-financial support 
o  institutional support 
o  information provision 





Source: based on Child and Rodrigues, 2005 
 
2.3. Pattern and Motives of Chinese outward investment 
The internationalisation of Chinese companies has evolved through a number of stages 
with different levels of engagement (Child and Rodrigues, 2006; Warner et al, 2004; 
Tseng, 1994; Cai, 1999). After China had adopted its open door policy in 1970s, the 
first generation of Chinese multinationals, large state-owned enterprises operating in 
monopolised industries emerged. These state-owned Chinese companies were important 
players  in  natural  resources,  driven  to  secure  control  of  such  resources  abroad 
(UNCTAD  2006).  Well-known  examples  include  as  CITIC  Group,  a  diversified 
financial  and  industrial  conglomerate  founded  in  1979,  COSCO,  China  State 
Construction Engineering Corporation and Sinochem. For these first-generation Chinese   10 
multinationals, Hong Kong most often presented the first and last overseas stop along 
their path of internationalisation.  
After the early 1990s, the second generation of major Chinese companies emerged in 
competitive  manufacturing  industries,  related  to  electronics,  information  and 
communication.  Here,  major  players  as  Haier  and  TCL  dominate  the  markets  for 
consumer electronics, while Huawei Technologies is competing against multinationals 
originating  from  industrialized  economies  in  the  global  telecom  equipment  market. 
Contrary  to  the  first  generation  of  State-owned  Chinese  multinationals,  the  second 
generation  is  characterised  by  “diverse  ownership  structures,  including  private 
ownership,  local  government  ownership  and  foreign  participation”  (UNCTAD 
2006:130).  Accordingly,  the  Chinese  internationalisation  path  has  evolved  from  the 
basic  levels  of  exporting  to  subcontracting  production  for  outsourced  foreign 
companies. Eventually, Chinese companies have reached the more advanced level of 
internationalisation,  involving  the  physical  and  organisational  expansion  of  Chinese 
firms into overseas locations funded by outward FDI and entailing the commitment to 
manage and organise operations located outside mainland China. 
The  motives  of  Chinese  overseas  expansion  can  be  categorised  according  to  the 
traditional  classification  of  resource-,  efficiency-,  market-  and  asset-seeking  FDI 
(Dunning,  1993).  Especially  towards  developing  countries,  China  is  driven  by  both 
resource and efficiency seeking factors, e.g. China has investments in the oil industry in 
14  countries,  including  Indonesia,  Kazakhstan,  Myanmar,  the  Sudan  and  Yemen 
(UNCTAD,  2004:  57).  Further,  to  support  exports,  Chinese  firms  establish  local 
distribution networks (especially in industries with excess production capacity such as 
machinery and electronic appliances) and relocate mature industries to lower wage sites 
(e.g.  bicycle  production  in  Ghana).  Increasingly,  Chinese  companies  are  targeting 
advanced developed economies such as Germany, Japan, Sweden and the United States 
to  build  international  brands,  access  advanced  technologies  and  to  establish  R&D 
centres.  Concluding,  we  follow  Child  and  Rodgrigues  (2005:  397)  observation  that 
today’s leading Chinese companies internationalise with a “more focussed and longer-
term  strategic  view  and  appear  to  be  developing  the  capacity  to  organise  overseas 
operations systematically” Consequently we assert that Chinese companies increasingly 
internationalise with a view to becoming a global player in international markets.    11 
 
3.  China’s “Go Global” Strategy 
3.1. Government policy for private investment 
In  the  recent  decades,  financial  liberalisation  and  economic  openness  have  led  to 
changes in the corporate governance, and a larger role of multinational companies in the 
global  economy.  FDI,  the  main  vehicle  of  their  operation,  has  gained  importance. 
Nowadays, practically all countries in the world vie and compete for FDI. In some 
countries attraction of FDI has even topped policy agenda, as the governments seek to 
attract  technology  and  create  jobs  and  production  capacities.  Hymer  (1960/1976) 
introduced  a  concept  of  “liability  of  foreigness”  meaning  that  entrant  firms  face 
disadvantage vis-à-vis domestic firms due to foreign exchange risks and unfamiliarity 
with the business conditions of the foreign market. It serves as justification for investment 
incentives provided to foreign companies entering a host economy (Morisset and Pirnia, 
2002). Moreover, the global business does not possess all necessary information about 
all potential locations on the globe; therefore, active promotion by the government is 
necessary. Overall, investment promotion has become a widely researched topic (e.g. 
Loewendahl, 2001; Enderwick, 2005; Zanatta et al, 2006). 
Foreign investment is a two-way street, the government can support outward investment 
by its domestic firms too. Broadly speaking, a government can play a role in the process 
of internationalisation of domestic firms through two channels. Firstly, it can foster 
technological development within the national economy, which would strengthen the 
home basis of companies, or secondly, it may stimulate companies with subsidies or tax 
rebates for moving overseas, so that the companies can leverage key assets otherwise 
not available in the home environment (UNCTAD, 2006). A state can also conduct 
“economic diplomacy” to promote the interests of their companies overseas. As this 
policy would lead to some sort of capital flight, it is unsurprising that only few countries 
conduct it. 
Currently,  it  seems  that  the  Chinese  government  has  been  focusing  on  the  second 
channel. It has been encouraging firms to invest abroad by relaxing approval procedures 
and offering them financial support and corporate income tax incentives. However, it   12 
was a long  road that  China  had to travel on  its way  to becoming one  of  the  main 
outward investors among developing countries. 
 
3.2. History of China’s policy for outward investment 
The Chinese government has been active in preparing its top companies to go overseas 
and expand. The first roots of China’s current policy for outward investment may be 
found back in 1979 when the government started encouraging outward FDI as part of 
the broader “open door  policy”. In fact, before 1979, outward investment was very 
limited, and mostly concentrated in trade-supporting activities, e.g. sales subsidiaries 
(Zhan, 1995). This policy had several goals, mainly securing supply of raw materials 
and strengthening economic ties with its neighbours (Zhan, 1995). 
Screening of every outward investment project was executed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  and  Economic  Cooperation  (MOFTEC).  The  first  MOFTEC-approved 
subsidiaries were established in 1979. By the end of 1983, 76 non-trading subsidiaries 
operating in 23 countries had been established, with the total investment valued at $900 
million (Wall, 1997). Only specific state-owned enterprises under strict state guidance 
were allowed to invest abroad; and every outward FDI project had to be screened (and 
approved) by  this authority. In  1985,  MOFTEC issued  a directive  which somewhat 
relaxed this extremely strenuous and centralised approach. Another directive was issued 
in 1989. Both directive established clear “rules of the game” and procedures. 
The directives also defined objectives for outward FDI: access to advanced technology 
and channelling it back home, access to raw materials, increased earning of foreign 
exchange and expansion of exports of goods and services, i.e. strengthening economic 
ties with its neighbours. As for the policy instruments, a wide array of measures were 
employed,  such  as  tax  incentives,  subsidies  and  privileged  access  to  the  domestic 
market  for  the  goods  manufactured  by  overseas  subsidiaries  of  Chinese  companies 
(Wall, 1997). 
From  the  early  1990s,  the  Chinese  government  switched  from  merely  allowing  to 
actively  encouraging  outward  direct  investment.  October  1993  was  an  important 
landmark  as  the  policy  of  outward  investment  was  endorsed  by  the  14th  National 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. While there was a clear trend of gradual   13 
liberalisation  of  outward  FDI  regime  in  the  1980s  and  early  1990s, some  obstacles 
emerged. First of all, the government feared of losing the control over the companies 
going  abroad  and  secondly,  many  overseas  subsidiaries  of  Chinese  companies 
performed quite poorly. The government tightened its grip over the internationalising 
companies and strengthened post-approval procedures. 
Overall, the experience of the 1980s and 1990s tells us that the Chinese government has 
been  always  trying  to  find  a  balance  between  the  perils  and  promises  of 
internationalisation of the Chinese companies. On one side, internationalisation would 
enable  access  to  raw  materials,  markets,  equipment  and  know-how.  Yet,  it  could 
jeopardise the state control over the companies, lead to poor financial performance due 
to weak management in subsidiaries and their inefficient monitoring, and ultimately 
cause excessive capital outflow. 
In  June  2000,  Shi  Guangsheng,  China’s  minister  for  foreign  trade  and  economic 
cooperation speaking at the “21st Century Forum” stated that the government would 
encourage national companies to go global turning into multinational companies. It was 
a  radical  shift  as  the  policy  has  extended  from  active  targeting  of  FDI  inflows  to 
promotion of FDI outflows too (Asian Economic News, 2000). 
Formally, China’s current strategy “Go Global” was initiated in 2002. The timing is 
unsurprising: in 2001 China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and support of 
the overseas expansion of Chinese companies became a priority for the government. 
The strategy aims to encourage its enterprises to invest overseas. The plan is to create 
between 30 and 50 national champions (to be in the Fortune 500 list, Annex 1) from the 
most promising state-owned enterprises by 2010, which are labelled as “state-owned but 
not government run”. 
The policy was further enhanced and bureaucratic process simplified. In October 2004, 
MOFCOM,  the  successor  of  MOFTEC,  announced  that  the  right  to  examine  and 
approve applications relating to outward investments would be transferred to the local 
departments of commerce. The number of documents necessary for the application was 
considerably  reduced.  And  in  2005,  China’s  Ministry  of  Commerce  introduced  a 
reporting mechanism, requiring companies to report overseas mergers and acquisition   14 
intentions.  On  1  July  2006,  foreign  exchange  purchase  constraint  for  outbound 
investment was abandoned thus making overseas investment even easier. 
 
3.3. Motives, instruments and agents of China’s outward investment policy 
Scholars  have  identified  several  key  reasons  for  outward  investment  policy  (e.g. 
Fischer,  2002).  They  can  explain  why  the  policy  was  initiated  in  the  specific 
circumstances of Chinese economy. 
Firstly, there is the macroeconomic situation and foreign trade. China has accumulated 
huge amounts of foreign reserves that are putting the upward pressure in the foreign 
exchange rate of Chinese renminbi. In the case of floating exchange rate that would be 
solved  in  a free  market  way  –  appreciation  of  the  Chinese currency.  But  since  the 
exchange  rate  is  fixed,  the  government  seeks  the  ease  the  pressure  in  the  national 
economy by investing and acquiring assets overseas. As for foreign trade, China has 
faced many anti-dumping complaints and hence outward investment rather than import 
has become a viable solution. 
Secondly, it is a business motive. Many Chinese companies grew big on the national 
market, and yet they haven’t been exposed to the tough international competition. Not 
many companies can grow organically anymore as the pace of change is increasing. 
Therefore, the government seeks to equip the domestic firms and their management 
with  international  experience  in  order  to  be  able  to  win  in  the competition  (Nolan, 
2001). It is worth emphasizing that the competition is played out not only on the global 
markets but also in China itself. As more and more multinationals enter China, domestic 
firms  that  once  enjoyed  dominance,  now  find  themselves  under  increasing  pressure 
from (more advanced) foreigners. This situation is completely different from the East 
Asian tigers – Hong Kong (China), South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of 
China  whose companies  established  dominance  in  their  home  markets  before  going 
abroad. Overall, by going global Chinese domestic companies would gain access to 
technology, know-how and skills, and to build their structure and operations in line with 
the  international  standards.  It  is  expected  that  access  to  these  factors  will  underpin 
further economic growth at home.   15 
The third motive is the politics or state diplomacy. China seeks to build its political 
capital and influence around the world. By supporting national companies, it seeks to 
use its “soft power” in contrast to U.S. military might – “hard power”. For example, 
while the U.S. asserts global control over natural resources (fossil fuels in particular) 
through its military presence worldwide, China aims to reach economic and political 
agreements  with  suppliers  of  natural  resources  –  “reserve  building”  strategy.  The 
miraculous growth of China’s outward investment and the significant role played by the 
Chinese government in this process indicate that political motivations are at least as 
important as the economic reasons (Cai, 1999). On the state level, China forms alliances 
with  other  developing  countries  in  political  forums  and  multilateral  negotiations;  it 
enhances access of Chinese companies to these markets. Moreover, Chinese companies 
may enter markets which are “no go” area for their Western counterparts, e.g. Sudan, 
Myanmar and Iran. Likewise, Russian multinational companies invest in Cuba, Libya 
and Syria. 
Last but not least, there is an issue of prestige. China seeks to project its image as a new 
leader  in  the  21st  century.  Similarly  to  the  organisation  of  the  Olympics  Games, 
Chinese government considers it as a matter of national pride to see Chinese firms in the 
top list of global companies, such as Fortune 500 and Forbes 2000. 
Overall, the state policy of support to firm internationalisation reflects the Confucian 
paternalistic approach of the Chinese leadership. It is the government that initiated the 
reforms in 1979 and hence it is the task of the government to prepare domestic firms for 
competition with Western companies in the global economy. 
The Chinese government has designed a set of policy instruments to be used within this 
policy area. They include, inter alia, information-sharing networks on overseas market 
development, access to foreign currency (low-interest funding from state-owned banks), 
direct and direct subsidies, and domestic tax breaks. For example, a state owned Export-
Import Bank of China offers special loans to domestic firms for international expansion. 
The China Development Bank is also active in this area. In 2005 it issued a low-cost 10 
billion US dollars loan to Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd for company’s international 
expansion.   16 
Another policy instrument is a database on foreign countries’ investment environments 
that  has been set  up by MOFTEC, and it helps companies facilitate the investment 
decision-making process. The database includes information about the legislation of the 
country in question (investment law, taxation policies), investment opportunities, etc. 
Aside from MOFTEC, another state agency is involved in the management of Chinese 
multinationals, it is the Chinese-government entity, the State-Owned Assets Supervision 
and  Administration  Commission  (SASAC).  It  is  nurturing  “national  champions” 
companies and encourages them to go global. SASAC controls 155 Chinese companies, 
which have combined 2006 revenues of 1.06 trillion US dollars and combined 2006 
assets of 1.56 trillion US dollars. It was established in 2003 to take over state-owned 
enterprises  whose  ownership  was  distributed  among  different  ministries.  SASAC 
reports directly to the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (BCG, 2008). 
 
4.  China and Europe: New Battlefields 
4.1. Global expansion of Chinese companies 
What are the implications of the rise of Chinese companies (and China’s government 
policy) for the European companies? Undoubtedly, it entails tougher and increasingly 
multifaceted competition between Chinese and European companies. More importantly, 
the  battlefields  of  competition  have  shifted  from  the  local  Chinese  market  and 
neighbouring Asia Pacific region to developing countries of Africa and Latin America. 
Not to say, that Europe itself will be the arena of fierce competition. 
The  following  analysis  will  provide  more  in  depth  insight  into  the  Chinese 
internationalisation strategy. 
Firstly, the companies compete on the global markets by the means of foreign trade. For 
example, Huawei Technologies is competing with Germany’s Siemens and Finland’s 
Nokia  on  the  global  market  of  telecom  equipment;  and  Haier  is  a  competitor  of 
Sweden’s Electrolux on the global market of white goods. 
Secondly, European companies are starting facing competition from Chinese companies 
in  the  markets  of  developing  economies,  where  the  West  has  traditionally  held  the   17 
dominance. As it has been noted above, Chinese companies are very active primarily on 
the markets of developing countries. 
Thirdly, a worrisome development for the European companies is that Chinese firms 
enter Europe and compete with them on their home ground. Although Europe is not the 
main destination of the Chinese investment, the trend is taking shape.  
 
4.2. Europeanisation of Chinese companies 
Broadly  speaking,  Europeanisation  refers  to  a  process  whereby  a  subject  adopts  a 
number of European features (Olsen, 2002). More often than not the term is used in the 
social  sciences  in  relation  to  European  political  integration  and  evolving  cultural 
identity of European citizens (Hansen and Wilson, 2000; Borzel and Risse, 2003). 
In the context of our research, in relation to Chinese companies, we operationalise this 
broad concept as sustained efforts to enter competitive European markets, to strengthen 
their presence in Europe with the goal of getting access to superior technologies, know-
how and competence. 
Europeanisation is more than simple initiatives of separate business entities, but rather a 
well-developed  strategy  orchestrated  by  the  Chinese  government.  While  indeed  the 
Chinese companies wish to strengthen the presence by expanding the production and 
capturing new markets, nevertherless the main goal is seen in strategic positioning and 
using  Europe  as  a  springboard  for  global  operations.  In  order  to  do  so,  they  use 
European-specific skills, methodologies, technologies and knowledge and align with the 
European code of conduct to sustain competitive pressure. 
In  an  attempt  to  pursue  Europeanisation,  many  Chinese companies  opt  for entering 
Europe  by  acquiring  assets  or  establishing  greenfield  projects  in  Western  European 
countries. Examples are many. Nanjing Automotive acquired U.K. car manufacturer 
Rover. In 2006, China Telecom established its European subsidiary in London. In July 
2005, the Nanjing Automobile Group purchased the remaining assets of British MG 
Rover Group; and motorbike manufacturer Qianjiang Motor acquired the operations of 
Italian Benelli Company. In 2004 Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tool Group 
acquired Schiess, a 140-year-old producer of heavy-duty lathes and boring machines,   18 
based in Aschersleben (Eastern part of Germany). The company was at the verge of 
bankruptcy and some parts of the production process were already being transferred to 
China.  After  acquisition,  the  core  business  of  Schiess  –  production  of  heavy-duty 
machines will stay in Europe. As for Shenyang, acquisition will enable it to gain access 
to Schiess’ unique expertise (Business Week, 2005). 
The  strategy  of  acquiring  finally-troublesome  engineering  companies  and  relocating 
production  process  to  lower-cost  locations  is  evident  in  the  case  of  TCL  too.  This 
Chinese  manufacturer  of  electronics  and  electric  appliances  started  his  “European 
invasion” from the acquisition of acquisition of Germany’s Schneider Electronics AG in 
October 2002. Yet, the company didn’t manage to retain all its operations in Germany 
and manufacturing part was relocated to Hungary later. November 2003, it acquired 
France-based  Thompson  Electronics’  television  operations.  In  July  2004,  TCL  and 
Thomson Electronics formed TCL Thompson Electronics (TTE), the world’s largest 
television manufacturer with assets of more than 500 million US dollars and an annual 
capacity of 20 million colour television sets. In August 2004 it acquired 55 percent of 
Alcatel’s mobile handset operations for 55 million US dollars, though the joint venture 
was later dissolved. 
As the examples illustrate, the perceived advantages of Western Europe for Chinese 
companies  are  access  to  technology,  know  how  and  expertise.  Yet,  the  cost  of 
manufacturing in Western Europe is extremely high, especially for Chinese companies. 
Moreover, the barriers to market entry are too high; the only viable solution seems to be 
acquisition of a domestic company. Even then, a newly acquired company has to sustain 
a  competitive  advantage.  Not  to  mention,  the  quality  standards  that  have  to  be 
maintained, especially for the European consumers who place a high premium on the 
quality of products. Finally, the strong labour regulations (and trade unions) in Europe 
will add to the overall challenge. 
Yet, it is the Western European consumer that holds the strongest purchasing power on 
the Continent. Hence, the Chinese companies face a tough challenge – the market is to 
be found in the West, but the chances for Chinese companies to enter and survive in 



































With the latest EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, Chinese companies found a new 
strategic opportunity. They enter Single European market through former communist 
states  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  now  the  new  EU  member  states  and  the 
commercial gateway to Europe’s half-a-billion market. This strategy allows Chinese 
investors to jump over EU tariff barriers
2 and to reap the benefits of the Single market, 
yet at a significantly lower cost comparing to the West European countries. In other 
words, this is the second type of Europeanisation pursued by the Chinese companies.  
As Figure 3 highlights, while the stocks of Chinese outward investment in the West 
(“old EU member states”) have tripled over the period of 2003-2006, the stocks in the 


















Figure 3 Stocks of outward FDI of BRICS economies (mln USD) 
 
Note: New EU member states (EU12) are depicted in yellow bars; old EU member states (EU15) are 
depicted in blue bars. Source: MOFCOM (2007) 
 
 
                                                
2 Tariff jumping can be  perhaps the  only  possible  strategy  taking into account numerous trade wars 
between China and the European Union. In many instances, the EU has accused China of dumping, and 
introduced progressive duties on a variety of goods. For example, throughout the 1990s, EU accused 
China of exporting TV sets at unjustifiably low prices; it introduced duties of 40% on most TV sets 
produced in China. These duties were lifted only in 2002, but even then EU imposed quotas on the 
amount  of  imports  and  introduced  minimum  required  prices.  Needless  to  say,  that  the  duty  is  not 
applicable if more than 50% of a product is made within the EU borders (by a Chinese subsidiary).   20 
4.2. New EU member states: a backdoor to Europe 
EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 has been a subject of wide debates and thorough 
research. In relation to international business, an issue of delocalisation is quite often 
raised. In search of the efficiency and cost-saving motives, multinational companies 
relocate their manufacturing activities from Western Europe to Eastern Europe. At the 
same time, as the living standards in the East improve and the wages increase, this 
competitive advantage is being eroded. Manufacturing is shifted further to the East (to 
the other side of EU border) or to South East Asia, China in particular. According to the 
European Restructuring Monitor (ERM, 2008), over 85% of all delocalised jobs from 
the EU15 over the period of 2002-2008 have been relocated to either new EU member 
states or Asia, with broadly equal proportions going to each region. This process has 
been known for long, and in fact it has largely overshadowed investment flows in the 
opposite direction, when the Chinese investors choose Eastern Europe as a point of 
entry to the Single European market. 
Whilst Taiwanese companies have been active in Eastern Europe since the opening of 
these  economies  in  1989,  mainland  Chinese  companies  have  been  reluctant  and 
hesitating  and  they  began  investing  in  Eastern  Europe  only  in  the  recent  years. 
Accession  of  Eastern  European  economies  to  the  European  Union  has  undoubtedly 
contributed to this process. 
As  Figure  4  shows,  four  main  investment  destinations  for  Chinese  companies  are 
identified  in  Eastern  Europe.  Czech  Republic,  Hungary  and  Poland  are  the  largest 
economies among the new EU member states that joined the bloc in 2004. The rise of 
the Chinese outward FDI stock in these countries is striking in 2005, with a one-year lag 
after 2004. Moreover, Romania that acceded to the Union in 2007 started recording FDI 
inflows from beginning of the 2000s. In the following analysis we look on Hungary, 

















































Figure 4 Stocks of outward FDI in selected new EU member states (mln USD) 
Source:  MOFCOM (2007) 
 
Hungary is being increasingly viewed as a manufacturing hub for Chinese companies 
targeting  the  Single  European  market.  Currently,  some  3000  Chinese-founded 
companies are operating in Hungary, and the value of their investment is 200 million 
US  dollars  (excluding  the  Bank  of  China  investment)  (Hungary  in  China,  2008). 
Hungary is a base for the following Chinese manufacturing multinationals: Changshu 
Standard Parts Factory (Hungarian Aogai Fastener Co., Ltd, fasteners manufacturing), 
Hisense  Hungary  Kft.  (electronics  manufacturing  –  LCD,  PDP,  CRT  TV),  Lenovo 
Technologies  Hungary  (PC  manufacturing),  Skyworth  Multimedia  Hungary  Kft. 
(entertainment electronics and IT products), TCL Overseas Holding Electronics Ltd. 
(LCD manufacturing), Shinco Electronics (DVD manufacturing), XOCECO – Prima 
Hungary  Kft.  (electric  household  appliances),  ZTE  Hungary  (telecommunications 
equipment and network solutions). 
The case of Hisense Company Ltd of Qingdao, Shandong Province is illustrative. In 
August 2003, management of the Chinese television maker visited  Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, looking for a site for company’s manufacturing activities. All 
three countries offered relatively similar conditions. Finally, the company opted for a 
Hungarian  town  of  Sarvar.  The  municipality  was  keen  to  find  a  new  investor  to 
counterbalance  withdrawal  of  another  multinational  –  Microsoft  Corporation,  which   22 
moved its production of X-Box game consoles to China. The decision was made in 
2004. Perhaps, a key factor for the investment was the presence of an industrial park 
operated by Flextronics, a Singaporean OEM. Hisense had already had partnership with 
Flextronics  as  it  produces  Hisense  phones  at  its  Chinese  plant  in  Shenzhen  (and 
Flextronics had already produced TV sets for the Chinese TV maker TCL in Hungary). 
Now Hisense has production bases in South Africa, Hungary, France, Pakistan, Algeria 
and  Iran.  The  TV  sets  produced  in  Sarvar  are  earmarked  for  the  EU  market 
(International Market News, 2004; Washington Post, 2004). 
As for the Czech Republic, its performance in terms of China’s inward investment is 
impressive too. Changhong Electronics is one of the biggest TV makers in China, with 
an annual turnover over 2 billion US dollars and stable overseas sales with a share of 
over 30% in the total revenue. In 2005 it announced its decision to invest totally 100 
million US dollars to set up a TV production base in the Czech town of Nymburk, east 
of  Prague.    Within  the  first  stage,  Changhong  planned  to  build  five  flat-panel  TV 
production  lines.  The  parent  company  established  a  wholly-owned  subsidiary 
(Changhong Europe Electric s.r.o.) with a registered capital of 9.5 million US dollars. 
As  planned  the  subsidiary  will  focus  not  only  on  manufacturing,  but  on  marketing 
consumer electronics and more importantly, on R&D. The annual output is to exceed 
one million units sold across Europe, thus making the Czech production base the largest 
overseas  plant  of  Changhong.  Investment  in  the  Czech  subsidiary  symbolises  an 
important starting point of the corporate internationalisation strategy, promotion of the 
Changhong brand and creating a firm foundation for its products in the single European 
market (Xinhua, 2005; Changhong, 2006). 
Recently, another Chinese company chose Czech Republic as a launching pad in its 
international expansion strategy. In May 2008 State-owned Shanghai Maling Food Co 
Ltd  opened  its  first  25  million  US  dollars  European  plant  in  a  Czech  village  of 
Hrobcice. It plans to bring its Chinese-style fare – luncheon meat, canned pork, ham and 
ready-to-eat  meals  –  to  Europe.  The  problem  the  company  faced  was  high  product 
standards  in  EU  and  import  restrictions  on  agricultural  goods,  hence  seriously 
hampering imports from China. The company considered several locations in Europe, 
but investment incentives (a five-year-long tax break) offered by the Czech government 
and  lower  labour  and  construction  costs  convinced  the  Chinese  investor.  The  new   23 
canning factory is in fact company’s second manufacturing investment in the Czech 
Republic (Business News, 2008; Deutsche Welle, 2008). 
Poland  recorded  the  largest  stock  of  Chinese  inward  investment  among  new  EU 
member  states.  The  latest  example  is  quite  illustrative.  In  2008,  Chinese  computer 
manufacturing  giant  Lenovo,  a  new  owner  of  IBM  production  unit  announced  its 
decision to build a factory and an order processing centre in Poland’s Legnica Special 
Economic Zone. Poland’s subsidiary is the first European desktop computers factory 
whose annual production is expected to reach 1.7 million computers. Lenovo will invest 
4.1  billion  euro  and  will  employ  around  1300  people  both  production  workers  and 
highly-qualified  specialists.  Lenovo  and  Volkswagen  are  two  flagship  investment 
projects in Legnica special economic zone (PAIiIZ, 2008). 
To sum up, while Chinese investors eye Western Europe as a repository of technology 
and  know-how  and  hence  the  dominant  business  strategy  is  mainly  acquisition  of 
existing (engineering) companies, Eastern Europe represents a slightly different case. It 
is a destination for efficiency-seeking foreign direct investment, with the purposing of 
establishing  manufacturing  base  and  exporting  to  the  West  duty  free  within  the 
boundaries of the Single European market. 
The European regulations require that more than half of the value of parts and labour 
used in the production must come from within Europe. The rest may come from China, 
so that Chinese companies may capitalise on their low-cost base. Manufacturing costs 
even in the new EU member states are much higher than in China and yet, the fact that 
goods produced within the EU borders may be sold duty-free across the Single market 
justifies manufacturing inside the EU over import of these goods from a home base in 
China. This strategy – moving a key part of supply chains closer to customers – enables 
to decrease transportation costs and avoid tariffs. 
Dunning (1993) developed a widely acknowledged classification of four main motives 
for investment: resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and strategic asset 
seeking FDI. In our analysis (Table 2) we aim to relate the investment strategies of 
Chinese  companies  entering  Europe  with  this  theoretical  framework.  We  look 
separately at Western and Eastern Europe.  
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Table 2 Motives of Chinese companies’ Europeanisation 
Dunning’s FDI types  1
st type of Europeanisation 
(Western Europe) 
2
nd type of Europeanisation 
(Eastern Europe) 
Resource-seeking (seeking 
access to natural resources) 
Europe does not appear on the Chinese investment map 
as a destination for resource-seeking investment. 
Market-seeking 
(“horizontal FDI”, seeking 
new markets) 
Western European market 
with its affluent consumer 
is a magnet for Chinese 
market-seeking FDI. 
Eastern European growing 
market may be lucrative 
for Chinese companies, 
especially in the lower-
priced goods sector. 
Efficiency-seeking 
(“vertical FDI”, seeking to 
restructure existing 
production through 
rationalisation and placing 
some parts of the value 
chain overseas) 
Strictly speaking, for 
efficiency-seeking FDI, 
Western Europe is 
unattractive due to the high 
costs of manufacturing. 
Manufacturing (assembly) 
of parts of the product as a 
way of tariff jumping. 
Asset-seeking (seeking 
strategically created assets) 
Acquisition of companies 
with strong expertise and 
utilisation of this expertise 
in the production process 
in the acquired company or 
elsewhere in the corporate 
network. 
Asset-seeking FDI from 
China in Eastern Europe is 
a limited phenomenon. 
Source: authors’ elaborations 
 
Despite seemingly clear-cut division of FDI types, it should be noted that FDI (either 
greenfield or acquisition) is most often driven by a combination of motives rather than 
by a single one only. For example, a Chinese company aspiring to build a competitive 
presence  in  Europe  has  the  possibility  to  acquire  a  manufacturing  firm  in  Western 
Europe  with  the  purpose  to  access  superior  European  technologies  and  know-how 
(asset-seeking)  while  relocating  the  manufacturing  process  to  Eastern  Europe 
(efficiency-seeking) and still serving the common European market (market-seeking). 
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4.3. European response to Europeanisation of Chinese companies 
The EU as a whole and each member state is concerned about the right balance between 
investment promotion and restriction on the political grounds. The question is whether 
Europe wants Chinese investment and hence exposing itself to potentially politically-
driven decisions of Chinese multinationals. The key perils and promises of the Chinese 
outward direct investment are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Perils and promises of Chinese investments in Europe 
Perils  Promises 
Chinese companies under the strong 
political influence of the Chinese 
government; Europe potentially exposes 
itself to the political leverage from 
Beijing.  
As a rule, Chinese investors acquire 
businesses in financial hardship, those 
who would go bankrupt and lead to job 
cuts and decrease of the tax base (e.g. 
Schiess AG, Schneider Electronics AG, 
Welz Industrieprodukte). Chinese may 
revitalise them. 
By acquiring assets in Europe, Chinese 
companies may get access to latest 
technologies and know-how. In the 
situation, when most Chinese companies 
are not familiar with the European IPR 
regime, European companies stand to 
loose their core technologies to the 
Chinese competitors. 
Favourable investment treatment of 
Chinese companies in Europe would 
enhance opportunities of European 
companies in the Chinese market 
(reciprocal investment treatment) 
Source: authors’ elaborations 
 
Chinese companies receive support from the Chinese government, and yet as any other 
investor they may also apply for investment incentives in a host country. Virtually all 
EU  member states offer these fiscal and financial incentives in  different forms and 
shapes.  Moreover,  most  EU  nations  provide  information  on  potential  investment 
projects. In some countries Chinese companies are explicitly targeted, attracted, and 
invited to invest. For example, Germany’s Cologne region launched “China Initiative”   26 
in  a  bid  to  attract  additional  investment  from  China.  A  similar  initiated  has  been 
launched in Düsseldorf (“Düsseldorf China Center”). As a result, Chinese companies 
may benefit from two sides. As for their European counterparts, they may rely only on 
investment incentives of the host country (e.g. China).  
 
Table 4 Chinese and European companies and government support to direct investment 
Support from  European company  Chinese company 
Home country  As a rule, no support for outward 
investment 
China’s “Go Global” policy 
(financial and non-financial 
support) 
Host country  Information provision 
Investment incentives granted by 
Chinese government 
Information provision 
Investment incentives (within the 
“state aid” regulations) 
Source: authors’ elaborations 
 
Europe becomes a battlefield of not European and Chinese companies as such, but that 
of public policies. Chinese government is pursuing the policy of “state capitalism” and 
“picking the winners” industrial policy, reminiscent  of old  industrial policies of the 
industrialisation  period  of  the  second  half  of  the  20th  century,  especially  in  Latin 
America. 
Yet,  on  the  European  continent,  negative  connotation  is  attached  to  the  seemingly 
outdated policies of “picking winners” and support to “national champions”. The title of 
one the recent publications of the European Commission perfectly expresses a departure 
from  this  approach:  “A  policy  for  industrial  champions:  From  picking  winners  to 
fostering excellence and the growth of firms” (EC, 2006). Instead, the focus of public 
policy has been on the promotion of entrepreneurship and support to small and medium-
sized enterprises (SME) by the horizontal policy measures. Moreover, direct support of 
national government would create an advantage for a company over its competitions. 
Therefore, in order to ensure fair competition across the Union, Article 87 of the EC 
Treaty generally prohibits state aid. Yet, state aid is allowed in some exceptional cases,   27 
such  general  measures  open  to  all  enterprises,  such  as  R&D  grants.  Overall,  the 
European  policy-making  has  been  developing  in  the  direction  of  innovation  policy, 
encompassing  science  and  technology  policy  (Borrás,  2003;  Lundvall  and  Borrás, 
2005). 
Logically, the question is whether European SME will be in a good shape to withstand 
the competitive pressure from huge Chinese conglomerates that are fully supported by 
the Chinese government. Can Europe’s horizontal innovation policy compete against 
China’s paternalistic industrial policy? 
While Europe is still at the crossroads, the U.S. government has found a solution. While 
it preaches the liberal economy and free trade, in the U.S. major cross border M&A 
deals are reviewed and cleared by the Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS) for 
“national security reasons”. As a result, the Chinese petrochemical company CNOOC 
withdrew its bid for Unocal in 2005. Europe is less restrictive in this respect. Should 
Europe follow the U.S. example and become more restrictive? 
 
5.  Conclusions 
China’s outward  investment  activity has undergone a considerable change lately, in 
terms  not  only  of  the  magnitude  but  also  the  geographical  focus  and  sectoral 
composition  of  flows.  The  paper  has  shown  that  Chinese  companies  consider 
internationalisation as a strong attempt to adjust and succeed in the global capitalist 
market. Yet, internationalisation of Chinese companies is not purely a business process 
but rather a part of well-coordinated strategy orchestrated by the Chinese government. 
Creation of “national champions” is a key motivation for the Chinese government to 
encourage outward investments, within the framework of its economic transformation.  
Internationalisation  of  Chinese  companies  can  be  considered as  a  policy  instrument 
applied in the pursuit of China’s integration in the global economy and leveraging its 
political interests. 
Europe is emerging as a promising destination for Chinese outward investments. Europe 
should  develop  a  comprehensive  strategy  towards  outward  investments  from  China. 
Whilst  the  Chinese  strategy  is  unique  per  se,  this  example  of  state-led   28 
internationalisation of domestic firms has already drawn interest from the part of other 
emerging economies, particularly Russia. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made a 
speech  in  January  2008  (while  still  in  the  capacity  of  Deputy  Prime  Minister)  to 
influential Russian big businesses. He appealed to Russian companies to “copy China” 
by expanding overseas and going on a global buying spree of foreign assets. "This is a 
very important task. The majority of powerful countries are engaged in this. Many of 
them  are  very  active,  like  China.  And  we  should  be  active,  too”  (Financial  Times, 
2008). Mr. Medvedev emphasised that expanding Russian presence overseas would be 
beneficial for the Russian economy and it would cut Russia’s dependence on foreign 
technology. A global expansion drive would “allow us to retool Russian enterprises 
with  technology,  boost  their  production  culture  and  grant  them  the  opportunity  to 
diversify investments and win new markets” (FT, 2008). 
In this paper we have developed the concept of Europeanisation of Chinese companies. 
There are still white spots where further research is needed. Despite the fact that the 
topic  of  China  in  general  has  been  extensively  researched,  however,  the  issue  of 
outward  investment  by  Chinese  companies  deserves  particular  attention.  We  have 
identified two main research avenues which need to be further developed. 
Firstly, research on subsidiaries. Aggregated data on the amount of outward of foreign 
direct investment is a very rough proxy for activities of multinationals. There is a need 
to “zoom in” to activities of Chinese multinationals in Europe. Hence, a logical step 
further is a study of subsidiaries of Chinese companies. Recent research on foreign 
subsidiaries  (starting  from  the  seminal  paper  of  Birkinshaw  and  Hood,  1998)  has 
equipped scholars with the tools for such analysis.  More specifically, the following 
questions  arise:  what  kind  of  functions  these  subsidiaries  possess,  what  level  of 
competence they have, what is the level of their autonomy, what is the path of their 
development and learning over time. Ultimately, the question is raised how the host 
country policy can shape technological development of subsidiaries and their evolution 
(Costa and Filippov, 2008; Filippov, 2008). 
Secondly, foreign direct investment (acquisitions or greenfield) represents a classic way 
of internationalisation. At the same time, dynamism and turbulence of global business 
environment have forced companies to adopt different strategy to internationalisation.   29 
One  of  them  is  by  forming  a  strategic  non-equity  alliance  with  foreign  partners. 
Strategic alliances are becoming a widely used tool of cooperation between European 
and Chinese companies (Duysters et al, 2007). 
The research on the topic is not a pure academic exercise, but rather it highlights the 
political and business implication of the current trend of China’s internationalisation 
activities  for  Europe.  The  penetration  of  Chinese  conglomerates  into  the  European 
continent  is  politically  and  financially  supported  by  the  state,  giving  them  the 
competitive edge over more market-oriented Western companies, as the former may not 
be subject to the same fiscal discipline vis-à-vis their capital providers. While the arrival 
of Chinese companies may pose a threat to the domestic European companies, the role 
of Chinese outward investment for the European economy cannot be ignored. It is with 
this  knowledge  and  understanding  of  the  Chinese  internationalizations strategy,  that 
European  policy  makers  are  equipped  to  formulate  careful  responses  to  the  arising 
challenges and to successfully reap the benefits of the Chinese presence.  
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BRIC companies in the Fortune 500 list 
 
2007  2006  2005   
Number   Revenues 
($ bn) 
Number   Revenues 
($ bn) 
Number  Revenues 
($ bn) 
Brazil  5  168.6  4  115.4  3  67.7 
Russia  4  176.0  5  157.7  3  86.5 
India  6  147.5  6  120.4  5  86.8 
China  24  838.5  20  617.4  16  464.5 
Mexico  5  172.6  5  146.8  2  78.2 
USA  162  7 338.4  170  6 816.9  176  6 221.8 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Fortune 500 list 
Note: Fortune 500 includes Hong Kong-based companies in the list of Chinese firms 
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